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United States v. Henry:

US Supreme Court, 1980 (Burger)

Author: P.V. Neff

 

  1. F: H was one of three who robbed a bank. While in jail before trial, he talked with N, a government informant in the same cellblock. N told the F.B.I., who had asked him to give them any info he had on anyone (but had told him only to listen, not to solicit information). The information was used at trial and H was convicted.

 

  1. P: The case went up to the US Supreme Court as was denied cert., then went back up again because H claimed he had not previously know that N was a paid government informant. The trial court still held against him, the appellate court reversed.

 

  1. I: Under these circumstances has the government “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements withikn the meaning of Massiah?

 

  1. H: Yes.
    1. Factors to look at:

                                                               i.      N was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the government

                                                             ii.      N was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of H

                                                            iii.      H was in custody and under indictment when he was engaged in conversation by N.

    1. Also, N was paid only if he produced useful information. There was a strong chance that even though the government had told him not to elicit information he would do so anyway. Of course the agent knew this.
    2. Massiah has been more seriously imposed in cases where the suspect did not know the other person was a government informant.
    3. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce H to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the government violated H’s 6th Amendment right to counsel.
  1. Dissent (Blackmun):
    1. The Court has changed the meaning of the word “intent.” Under the new rule even negligent triggering of events could be called intentional.
    2. The fact that H didn’t know N was an informant is of no Constitutional significance, according to Brewer.
    3. Incarceration is different than custodial interrogation, which the Court had acknowledged can intimidate or coerce the suspect into incriminating himself. This was not the case for H, who was in jail—no pressure to talk to N. I.e., the fact that he was in jail adds nothing to the amount of coerciveness.
  2. Dissent (Rehnquist):
    1. The doctrinal underpinnings of Massiah are misunderstood. The Court has never held that an accused is constitutionally protected from his inability to keep quiet. When he voluntarily makes incriminating statements they can be used.
    2. Law enforcement should not be prohibited from doing its job, using covert operations in investigation, just because formal proceedings have commenced.