Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:   
United States Supreme Court, 1979. 

Statement of the Case:

      Consenting D, Bustamonte, was convicted of possessing a check with intent to defraud and moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure, since he was ignorant of his right to decline giving the officers consent to search his car.

Procedure:

      Lower court ruled for the State.

Facts:

      An officer on a routine patrol at 2:30 in the morning observed an automobile with a broken headlight. He stopped the car, and the driver was unable to produce a driver's license. There were five other passengers, and only one could produce a license. The officer asked that person (who said that the car was his brother's) if he could search the car. The person allowed him to search, and the officer found three stolen checks.  Bustamonte (D) was convicted after these checks were admitted into evidence at his trial.

Issue:

      Whether the State must always demonstrate that consent to search was voluntarily given when the party being searched is not in police custody.

Procedural Result:

      Judgment affirmed for the State.

Holding:

      The State does not have to demonstrate that consent to search was voluntarily given when the party being searched is not in police custody.

Reasoning:

• Test for Voluntariness:  Based on the totality of the circumstances, namely:
  • Characteristics of the accused, and
  • Details of the interrogation.
• Rule:  When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
• The Due Process Clause does not require the state to prove that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer questions.
• His state of mind and the police's failure to advise him of his rights are certainly factors, but are not in themselves determinative.
• Policy:  There are two competing concerns when determining voluntary consent:
  • the legitimate need for such searches, and
  • the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.
• In order to satisfy both concerns, then, one must determine voluntariness as a question of fact from all the circumstances surrounding the case.
  • While the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
• In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics.

Dissent:

• I do not understand how a citizen can waive a meaningful constitutional right without being aware of it.

Dissent:

• Real issue is whether the D needs to be told of their constitutional right to not give consent.
• This case deals with consent, not coercion. The police should advise the suspect of his rights to refuse consent.