4LawSchool.com Outlines Bank
Author:
Professor:
Professor Thomas
Proof of Guilt
Proof Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt
Presumption of Innocence
Only takes 51% because the state has won on the trial
level. Presumption of innocence has
disappeared. Standard of review is
sufficiency of the evidence.
Owens v. State 14
Facts: Man found in
running car with two empty beer cans. Conv of drunk driving
Issues: Whether the
evidence was legally sufficient to support such findings.
Rule: A conviction
upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the
circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Application: The
theory of the state’s case rests upon the principle that present stasis on the
driveway implies earlier motion on the highway.
The appellant could have reasonably been doing one of two things; just
getting home, or just leaving. To
convict, there would have to be some other factor that would enhance the
former.
Conclusion/Holding:
The totality of the circumstances are, in the
last analysis, inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Affirmed.
Jury Nullification
State v. Ragland 19
Facts: A previously
convicted felon was convicted in a jury trial.
The judge’s instructions included the word “must” when explaining the
findings.
Issues: Instructions for jury nullification and when he used
the word “must” instead of “may.”
Application: The only
effect of such an instruction would be to make it more likely that juries will
nullify the law. Jury nullification is an unfortunate but unavoidable
power. It should not be advertised.
CRIMINAL STATUTES
Requirement of Previously Defined
Conduct
Critical Legal Studies - there is no fixed meaning for
anything, everything may be interpred.
(situated)
Commonwealth v. Mochan p.78 Penn
Facts: Mochan was charged with harassing the victim with lewd,
obscene language.
Issues: Was the
conduct charged in the indictments, concededly not a criminal offense in this
state by any statue
Rule: The principal of legality, or nulla poena sine lege,
condemns judicial crime creation.
Application: The
common law is sufficiently broad to punish as a misdemeanor, although there may
be no exact precedent, any act which directly injures or tends to injure the
public to such an extent as to require the state to interfere and punish the
wrongdoer, as in the case of acts which injuriously affect public morality, or
obstruct, or pervert public justice, or the administration of government.
Conclusion/Holding: Judgement affirmed
Keeler v. Superior Court 81
Facts: The victim was hit in the stomach by her ex-husband
and the baby she was carrying was born dead.
Issues: Whether an
unborn but viable fetus is a “human being” within the meaning of the
Rule: Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with
malice aforethought.
Application: The Legislature did not intend the meaning of
human being to include a fetus. An
infant could not be the subject of homicide at common law unless it had been
born alive, and this one was not. Conclusion/Holding: Charges are dismissed
DISSENTING: Because of
medical advances, the child could have been born alive and therefore should be
considered a human life.
The Values of Statutory Clarity
IN Re Banks 90
Facts: Defendant says
that he could not have violated the statue because it is unconstitutional and
too vauge.
Rule: Any person who shall peep secretly into any room
occupied by a female person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined or imprisioned in the
discretion of the court.
Application: Where a
statue is susceptible to two interpretations - one constitutional and one
unconstitutional - the Court should adopt the interpretation resulting in
finding of constitutionaly.
Conclusion/Holding:
Statue stands
Statutory Interpretation
Panels of three judges, petition for a rehearing en banc
where all the judges in the circuit try the case.
Rule of lenity - if the legislature is unclear, give lenience
to the accused.
Facts: Police pulled
defendant over, in his truck bed, in a zipped-up bag, under a tarp, was a
loaded pistol and a bucket with drug paraphernalia. He was convicted of possession and carrying a
weapon.
Issues: Was the
defendant carrying a gun?
Rule: Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.
Application: It has been held that in order to be convicted,
the defendant must have transported the firearm on or about his person. This means the firearm must have been immediately
available for use by the defendant. The
key it that the weapon must remain within easy reach
while the individual is in motion. If
carry were defined in the broader sense, it would become synonymous with
possess or transport. Congress should give
clearer instruction.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment reversed.
DISSENT: In ordinary
usage, the verb “carry” includes transportation or causing to be
transported. Nothing in the legislative
history indicates that Congress intended any hypertechnical
or narrow reading of the word carries.
ACTUS
Actus Reus + Mens Rea = Liability (Prima
facie means the prosecution proved this formula)
Actus Reus = act + (if required) attendant circumstances +
(if required) causation + (if required) result
Kant says that no harm becomes from only a thought
Voluntary act - 1) uncohersed or 2)
does it manifest the will of the actor
Result crime
Conduct crime
Voluntary Act
Martin v. State p112
Facts: Police came the
arrested the drunk defendant and took him onto the highway. He was convicted of being drunk on a public
highway and appealed.
Issues: Whether a man
can involuntarily commit a crime.
Rule: Code 1940, Title
14, Section 120. (Public drunkenness)
Application: Under the
plain terms of this statue, a voluntary appearance is presupposed.
Conclusion/Holding:
Conviction reversed.
Time framing - look at the narrowist
section of time.
State v. Utter p114,
Facts: The son was
fatally stabbed by the father. The
defendant was a combat infantryman and drinking. heavily
all day. From a conviction of
manslaughter, he appealed.
Issues: Whether it was
error to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence on conditional response.
Rule: An act of
homicide involves an exercise of the will.
It signifies something done voluntarily.
Application: An act committed while one is unconscious is in
reality no act at all. It is merely a
physical event or occurrence for which there can be no criminal liability. However, this defense is shaky when the
defendant is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The issue of whether or not the appellant was
in an unconscious or automatistic state at the time he allegedly committed the
criminal acts charged is a question of fact.
Conclusion/Holding:
The evidence is insufficient to support this defense.
Omissions
People v. Beardsley p.118
Facts: Man placed
drunk lover who overdoesed in the basement and she
died. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter and appealed.
Issues: Whether the
defendant owned the victim a duty which he failed to perform
Rule: It must be a
duty imposed by law or by contract and the omission to perform the duty
must be the immediate and direct cause of death.
Application: The fact
that this woman was in his house created no such legal duty as exists in law
and is due from a husband towards his wife.
Conclusion/Holding:
Conviction is set aside.
Distinguishing Acts From Omissions
Barber v. Superior Court p.124
Facts: Two doctors
unplugged the life support system to include the intravenous feeding tubes of
the victim. There was consulting with
the family and the prognosis was extremely poor.
Issues: Whether the
evidence presented before the magistrate was sufficient to support his
determination and petitioners should not be held to answer to the charges of
murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
Rule: “Life” is brain
function rather than mere metabolic processes which result from respiration and
circulation.
Application: The
cessation of life support measures is not an affirmative act but rather a
withdrawal or omission of further treatment.
Although there may be a duty to provide life-support in the immediate
aftermath of a arrest, there is no duty to continue
its use once it has become futile.
Conclusion/Holding:
The petitioners’ omission to continue treatment under the
circumstances was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty.
MENS REA
Facts:. The appellant went to his cellar and took the
gas meter out for money without turning off the gas. His future mother-in-law who lived next door
was partially asphyxiated. Accused was
convicted.
Issues: Did the judge
misinform the jury that maliciously means wicked
Rule: Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or taken
by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as
thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon
such person any grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty of felony.
Application: Malice must not be taken out in the old vague
sense of wickedness. In modern law, it
is seen more narrowly. It should have
been left to the jury to decide.
Conclusion/Holding:
Conviction overturned.
Proving Culpability
Intent
Knowingly - practically certain.
Specific intent - elements include separate intent from the actus
General intent
People v. Conley p.135
Facts: The defendant assaulted another man. As a result, the victim has mucosal mouth,
partial numbness in one lip, and diminished life expectancy of his teeth. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated
battery based solely on permanent disability.
Issues: Whether the
victim incurred a permanent disability and that the defendant intended to
inflict a permanent disability.
Rule: A person who, in committing a battery, intentionally or
knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement
commits aggravated battery.
Application: For an injury to be deemed disabling, all that
must be shown is that the victim is no longer whole such that the injured
bodily portion or part no longer serves the body in the same manner as it did
before the injury.
Intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances,
the offender’s words, the weapon used, and the force of the blow.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment affirmed.
Knowledge
State v. Nations p.145
Facts: Defendant owns and operates a disco where police found
a 16 year old stripping. Defendant was
convicted of endangering the welfare of a child.
Issues: Whether the
state failed to show the defendant knew the child was under seventeen.
Rule: § 568.050 requires the state
prove the defendant “knowingly” encouraged the child.
Application: While in the Model Penal Code “knowingly”
encompassing willful blindness of a fact, this states
choose to limit the definition to actual knowledge.
Conclusion/Holding: Judgment reversed.
Statutory Interpretation
US v. Morris p.149
Facts: D placed a worm
on the internet to show it was insecure.
It went crazy and he tried to stop it.
Issue: Whether D
intended to prevent unauthorized use of the computer’s information
Rule: anyone who
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization, and by means of one or
more instances of such conduct alters, damages, or destroys information in any
such computer, or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information
and thereby causes loss to one or more others of a value aggregating $1000 or
more during any 1 year period.
Application: The
intentionally standard applies only to the accesses phrase and not to its
damages phase.
Conclusion: Affirmed
Strict Liability Offenses
Staples v.
Facts: The defendant was caught with a
M-16 rifle that was filed down. He
stated that the rifle had never been fired automatically when it was in his
possession. The defendant wanted the
trial court to instruct the jury that the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knew the gun would fire automatically. The judge refused and he was found
guilty. Because the statue had no mens
rea, it was found it be strict liability.
Appellant court affirmed.
Issues: Whether the
trial court erred in jury instructions.
Rule: The National Firearms Act prohibits automatic
weapons.
Application: Mens rea has been followed in regard to
statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include
it. To dispense with mens rea would criminalize a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct.
It is unthinkable to us that Congress intended to subject
such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible ten-year prison term
if what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional
semi-automatic weapon turns out to have worn down into or been secretly
modified to be a fully automatic weapon.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment reversed.
Garnett v. State p.164 Mary
Facts: Defendant was a mildly retarded 20 year
old who had sex with a 13 year old girl.
The crime was a strict liability offense with no mens rea in the
offense. The court found him guilty.
Issues: Whether this
is a strict liability offense
Rule: A person is guilty of rape if the person engages in
vaginal intercourse with another person: Who is under
14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older
than the victim.
Application: Modern scholars reject the strict liability
theory stating it does not deter. The
Model Penal Code generally recognizes strict liability for offenses deemed
“violations” defined as wrongs subject only to a fine, forfeiture, or other
civil penalty upon conviction, and not giving rise to any legal
disability. This Legislature aimed to
make statutory rape with underage persons a more severe prohibition based on
strict criminal liability.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment affirmed.
Dissent: Presumably a
20 year old, who passes out because of drinking too many beers, would be guilty
of a sexual offense if a 13 year old engages in sexual activities with the 20
year old while they are out. This is
inconsistent with due process.
Mistake and Mens Rea
Mistake of Fact
People v. Navarro p.172
Facts: The defendant took four wooden beams from a
construction site. Defendant was
convicted of petty theft.
Issues: Whether the jury erred in giving the instruction that
the defendants actions had to be reasonable to act in
good faith.
Rule: Every person who shall feloniously steal the personal
property of another is guilty of theft.
Theft is, the tresspassory taking
and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to steal
the property.
Application: One cannot intend to steal property which he
believes to be his own, or that he believes is abandoned.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment reversed.
NOTES:
Specific / general intent
General intent crimes need to be reasonable.
Specific intent crimes such as larceny have no reasonability
rules.
Mistake of Law
People v.
Facts: An out-of-state prision
guard a personal misunderstanding of the statue. He was convicted.
Issues: Did the D make
a mistake about what the law prohibits.
Rule: A person is not relieved of criminal liability for
conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does
not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is
founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute
or other enactment *** (d) an interpretation of the statute or law relating to
the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency, or body
legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of
administering, enforcing or interpreting such statue or law.
Application: Ignorance of the law is no excuse. This defense should not be recognized, except
where specific intent is an element of the offense or where the misrelied-upon law has been properly adjudicated as wrong.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment affirmed.
DISSENT: The dogmatic
rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse has remained unaltered. Only a defendant who is not mistaken about
the law when he acts has a mistake of law defense
MPC: A belief that
conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution
for that offense based upon such conduct when *** (b) he acts in reasonable
reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be
invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment
Cheek v.
Facts: The defendant, an airline pilot, ceased to pay income
taxes. The court instructed the jury that an honest but unreasonable belief is
not a defense and does not negate willfulness.
Issues: Whether it was
errer to instruct the jury that willfullness
can be negated by reasonable good will.
Rule: Any person who willfully attempts in any manner
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall
be guilty of a felony.
Application: A claimed good-faith belief does not have to be
reasonable to negate willfulness.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment reversed.
DISSENT: A licensed
pilot should be held to a reasonable person standard.
NOTES:
Mistake of law about another law.
Mistake about meaning or scope or existence of the law
defendant charged with violating.
CAUSATION
Velazquez v. State p.194 Flor
Facts: The defendant was auto racing with the victim. The victim died when he crashed into a guard
rail. Defendant was prosecuted for
vehicular homicide.
Rule: Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being by
the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to
cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
Application: Where a
defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result, the courts
decline to impose criminal liability (1) where the prohibited result of the
defendant’s conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger
created by the defendant’s conduct, or (2) where it would otherwise be unjust.
In relatively rare cases the “but for” test for
causation-in-fact fails and has been abandoned in favor of the “substantial
factor” test as when two defendants concurrently inflict mortal wounds upon a
human being, each of which is sufficient to cause death.
Actual Cause
Oxendine v. State p.196 Dela
Facts: Both D and his live-in girlfriend beat his son. D was convicted of manslaughter and appeals.
Issues: Did the trial court error by denying his motion for a
judgment of acquittal on the issue of causation.
Rule: A finding of medical causation may not be based on
speculation or conjecture.
Application: The pathologist identified two distinct
injuries. Doctor A stated he was unable
to tell which injury caused the death.
Doctor B stated it was the earlier injury that caused the death. If the second injury caused his son to die
ant sooner, then D, who inflicted the second injury, would be deemed to have
caused his son’s death.
Conclusion/Holding: Reversed and remanded to assault in the
second degree.
Proximate Cause
Kibbe v.
Facts: V was drinking heavily and was robbed by D who left
him on the side of the road without his glasses. A man driving down the road,
hit the victim who was sitting in the middle of the road.
Issues: Whether the
judge failed to define or explain the issue of causation.
Rule: Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which create
a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of
another person.
Application: When the judge erred, he allowed the jury to
convict without finding that every element of the crime had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion/Holding:
Reversed
Concurrence of the Elements
State v. Rose p.209 RI
Facts: D struck V who was later found wedged beneath the
vehicle. D was found guilty of
manslaughter.
Issues: Was the victim
dead upon impact?
Rule: The victim has to be dead immediately after impact for
the D to be found guilty.
Application: The only medical witness stated death could have
resulted immediately upon impact. Lacking any reasonable medical certainty as to the time of death.
Conclusion/Holding: Reversed
CRIMINAL HOMOCIDE
Murder - 1st degree, 2d
Manslaughter - Vol, Invol
No crime - Tort, No Responsibility
People v. Eulo p.1984 NY
Facts: The accused
shot the victim in head. At the hospital
he was placed on a respirator and later declared brain dead.
Issues: Did the trial
judge adequately instruct the jury for what constitutes death and what time
criminal liability for a homicide would attach.
Application: To
construe our homicide statute to provide for criminal responsibility for
homicide when a defendant’s conduct causes injury leading to the victim’s total
loss of brain functions, is entirely consistent with the legislature’s concept
of death.
Conclusion/Holding:
There was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant’s conduct caused the victim’s
death and that the medical processes were not superseding causes of death.
Intentional Killing
State v.
Facts: From an
argument, accused stabbed victim 51 times.
Accused states self-defense because victim had reached into his
pocket. Found guilty of murder one,
defendant appealed.
Issue: Jury Instru. Is it
necessary that the intention exist for any set length of time prior to the
killing
Rule: An intent to kill need only exist for an instant
Conclusion: Court did
not err in its instructions.
Midgett v. State p.233
Facts: Defendant
consistently beat his son until he died one day.
Issue: Whether the
state’s evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Rule:
…premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of
another person
Application: There is
no evidence that he killed his son by premeditation and deliberation causing
his death.
Conclusion: No
evidence of premeditation, reduced to 2nd degree.
DISSENT: The degree of
murder committed is for the jury to decide.
The jury could easily conclude that such repeated treatment was intended
to kill the child.
Motive is different from mens rea.
State v.
Facts: Defendant
admitted his terminally ill father to a hospital. He shot him four times in the head while in
bed and walked out of the hospital.
Convicted of murder one, and appealed.
Issue: Whether trial
judge erred in refusing to grant directed verdict for insufficient evidence of
premeditation and deliberation.
Rule: First degree
murder is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being with malice and
with premeditation and deliberation.
Application: These
elements are usually proved by circumstantial evidence.
Conclusion: Affirmed
Manslaughter
The difference between murder and manslaughter is the
presence or absence of malice.
Girouard v. State p.238 Mary
Facts: Woman kept
insulting defendant until he snapped and stabbed her 19 times. Convicted of murder two.
Issue: Whether words
alone are adequate provocation to change to manslaughter from murder two.
Rule: Traditional
manslaughter limited to: extreme assault
or battery upon the defendant; mutual combat; defendant’s illegal arrest;
injury or serious abuse of a close relative of the defendant’s; or the sudden
discovery of a spouse’s adultery.
Application: Rule of
Provocation:
1.
There must have been adequate provocation;
2.
The killing must have been in the
heat of passion;
3.
It must have been a sudden heat of
passion before it cools
4.
There must have been a causal
connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.
Conclusion: Because D
was not reasonable, provocation was not adequate.
Justification focuses on the act; excuse focuses on the
actor.
Provocation is a PARTAL defense.
Reasonable Man/Objective Standard
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin p.250
Facts: Fifteen year
old boy killed victim with a frying pan after he was sodomized. He asked for manslaughter based on
provocation. Judge instructed the jury
on reasonable man.
Issue: Whether the
jury should have instructed on the reasonable boy standard.
Application: The reasonable
man referred to in the question is a person having the power of self control to
be expected of an ordinary person of the same sex and age of the accused.
Conclusion: Affirm
Court of Appeals.
Murder v. Manslaughter
People v. Casassa p.257 NY
Facts: D stabbed and
drowned exgirlfriend.
Witness claimed “his disturbed state was not the product of external
factors but rather was a stress he created from within himself.”
Issue: Whether the
defendant, in a murder prosecution, established the affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance which would have reduced the crime to
manslaughter.
Rule: It is an
affirmative defense degree where “the defendant acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse.
Application: Extreme
emotional disturbance may be that a significant mental trauma has affected a
defendant’s mind for a substantial period of time.
Conclusion: Affirmed.
Unintentional Killings
Berry v. Superior Court p.266
US
Facts: A fighting pit
bull was tied at the D’s house guarding a marijuana patch. A neighbor’s 2 year old child, left
unguarded, roamed into the yard and was attacked and died.
Issue: Can D be tried
for murder with implied malice?
Rule: Two requirements:
1.
Shown extreme indifference to the
value of human life.
2.
D was aware of the risks of the
conduct or the conduct was contrary to law.
Application: The fighting dog did pose a treat to humans and
it had an exceptionally hard bite and D was aware of these facts.
Conclusion: Sufficient
evidence for trial.
State v. Hernandez p.273
Facts: D killed V by
auto after he drank some whiskey and a 12 pack.
He had numerous bumper stickers about drinking that were admitted into
evidence. Jury found D guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.
Issue: Did the trial
judge err in admitting the stickers into evidence? Yes
Rule:
…that D acted with criminal negligence; and that, in so doing, D
caused the victim’s death.
Application: In order
for evidence to be relevant, it must logically tend to support or establish a
fact or issue between the parties. The
state did not have to prove that D knew of the effects of alcohol upon him.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Dissent: MPC states
the jury first had to determine that the D created a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of which he ought to have been aware.
Purpose
Knowledge
Recklessness +
Recklessness
Criminal Negligance
State v. Willliams p.277
Facts: Ds were charged
and found guilty of manslaughter for failing to give their infant medical
attention.
Issue: Did the D meet
the requirements for negligence in manslaughter?
Rule: Washington
requires only simple or ordinary negligence for manslaughter.
Application: The Ds
were aware that medical help was available but ignorant in that they thought
the child had a toothache.
Conclusion: There is
sufficient evidence applying the standard of ordinary caution. Affirmed.
Unlawful Conduct
People v. Stamp p.285 US
Facts: D entered the
victim’s office and robbed it. Shortly
thereafter, victim died from heart attack.
Issue: Is this crime
applicable to the felony murder rule?
Rule:
…a killing committed in either the perpetration of or an attempt
to perpetrate robbery is murder of the first degree.
Application: D is held
strictly liable for all killings committed by him or his accomplices in the
course of a felony.
Conclusion: Guilty.
No proximate cause requirement
No mens rea
RAPE
Actus Reus
Forcible Rape
Rusk v. State p.363 Mary
Facts: Victim meet D and went into her apartment after he took her car
keys. He put his hands on her
throat. She took off her clothes and
performed oral sex and intercourse. Convicted rape 2nd and assault.
Issue: Is the evidence
sufficient to conclude that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
Rule: A person is
guilty of rape in the second degree if he (1) engages in vaginal intercourse
with another person, (2) by force or threat of force, (3) against the will, and
(4) without the consent of the other person.
Application: Force is
an essential element of the crime. We
have been unable to see any resistance.
Conclusion: The
evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of rape. Reversed.
Dissent: We have
perpetuated and given new life to myths about the crime of rape that have no
place in our law today. Consent is not
the issue here, only whether
there was sufficient evidence of force or the threat of force.
Rusk - Court of Appeals of Maryland p.368
The reasonableness of the victim’s apprehension of fear was
plainly a question of fact for the jury to determine. Reversed.
Dissent: She must
follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words.
State v. Alston p.372
NC
Facts: D and V were
involved for six months prior to the incident.
She left and D and he said he wanted to have sex one more time. She told him no but she complied and cried
during intercourse. Later, he came to her
apartment he they had concentual sex all night.
From a conviction, D appeals.
Issue: Whether the
evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of 2nd degree
rape.
Rule: Second degree
rape involves vaginal intercourse with the victim both by force and against the
victim’s will.
Application: There is
substantial evidence that the act was against her will. The threat by D and his act of grabbing
(force) appeared to have been unrelated to the act of sexual intercourse.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz p.385
Penn
Facts: V went to D
room looking for his roommate. She was
drinking and walked in on D. She said no
repeatingly while they had intercourse.
She jumped up after they were done and ran downstairs and cried when she
saw her boyfriend. Facts were
contested. Defense claims V had asked D
the size of his penis and laid down on his bed several
times and passionately returned his kisses.
Jury convicted D of rape.
Issue: Do the facts
support a conviction?
Rule: A person commits
a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another
person not his spouse:
(1)
by forcible compulsion;
(2)
by threat of forcible compulsion that
would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(3)
who is unconscious; or
(4)
who is mental deranged
Application: She was
neither hurt nor threatened and never screamed or attempted to summon
help. Although evidence of verbal
protestations may be relevant to prove that the intercourse was against the
victim’s will, it is not dispositive of sufficient evidence of “forcible compulsion.”
Conclusion: Trial
court erred in determining the evidence adduced by the State was sufficient to
convict.
State of
Facts: A told V he was
going to make a trip to her room. She
awoke with him penetrating her. She
slapped him and he left. The facts are controvesial as follows:
For three days prior, they had been kissing and V had encouraged A to
come up to her room. After returning
from the bathroom, V began kissing with A and began consentual
intercourse. After the fourth thrust,
she pushed him away and slapped him.
Appellate reversed.
Issue: Whether the
element of “physical force” is met simply by an act of non-consensual
penetration.
Rule: A person who
commits an act of sexual penetration using physical force or coercion is guilty
of second-degree sexual assault.
Application: When a
statue is open to conflicting interpretations, the court seeks the underlying
intent of the legislature, relying on legislative history and the contemporary
context of the statute. Physical force
in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required for
such penetration to be unlawful.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Deception
Boro v. Superior Court p.406
Facts: D told V she
had a fatal disease and there were two cures, a expensive,
painful surgery, or sex with a donor for $4500.
D seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain further prosecution.
Issue: Whether the D’s
motion to dismiss should have been granted.
Rule: Rape - an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the
perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:…(4)
Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is
known to the accused.
Application: It was
her belief that she would die unless she consented to sexual intercourse with
the D but she was not unconscious of the nature of the act.
Conclusion: Yes,
reversed.
Mens Rea
Commonwealth v. Sherry p.413
Mass
Facts: V and Ds went to a
home and had verbally protested sex. Each defendant believed there was consent.
Issues: Whether the
proper jury instructions were given.
Application: The
defendants’ requested instruction would have required the jury to “find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of the victim’s lack
of consent.
Conclusion: Affirmed.
Rape Shield Laws
People v. Wilhelm
p.422 Mich
Facts: D viewed V expose her breasts in public and allow two men to fondle
them. D had nonconsentual
intercourse with V
Issue: Whether the
trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited him from introducing
certain testimony concerning alleged prior acts of the victim.
Rule: Rape shield
statute prohibits evidence of the V’s sexual conduct with another.
Application: Evidence
of a victim’s sexual conduct with a third party is irrelevant
Conclusion: Because
the evidence was irrelevant, D was not denied his right of confrontation.
Cautionary Jury Instructions
State v. Bashaw p.426 Oreg
Issue: Did the trial
court err in refusing to give the D’s jury instructions?
Instruction: “A charge such as that made against the
defendant in this case is one which is easily made and once made difficult to
defend against even if the person accused is innocent. Therefore, the law requires that you examine
the testimony of the female person named in the Information with caution.
Application: This jury
instruction requested by the defendant should never be given in any rape case.
Conclusion: The trial
court was correct in refusing to give the instruction.
General Defenses
Burden of Proof
Patterson v.
Facts: After a brief
marriage, V started dating her neighbor.
A borrowed a rifle and observed his wife undressed with the
neighbor. A entered the house and killed
neighbor. A was charged w/ murder 2nd.
Issue: Whether the
defendant is burdened by proving his defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
Rule: Intent to cause
the death of another person; and causing the death of such person. (NO MALICE HERE)
A person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally kills
another person “under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
acts under the influence of extrreme emotional
disturbance.
Apllication:
There is an affirmative defense that he “acted under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse”
Conclusion: Affirmed.
Justification
Self-Defense
Facts: D caught V
stealing windshield wipers and yelled at them.
When he went into the house to get a gun, the men got into the car. When D reappeared, the deceased got out of
the car with a crowbar and walked towards the D who fired and killed them. Charged with murder 2nd and
convicted by jury of manslaughter.
Issue: Whether the
trial judge erred when he gave instructions to consider if D was the aggressor
and to consider his failure to retreat.
Rule: There must have
been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force against the
defendant. The threat must have been
unlawful and immediate. The defender
must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death or serious bodily
harm, and that his response was necessary to save himself therefrom.
Application: One is
the aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities
of self-preservation. Only in the event
that he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts to do so is he restored to his right of
self-defense.
Conclusion: Affirmed.
The castle doctrine states they is
no fault if attacked in his home and there is no duty to retreat.
People v. Goetz p.466
NY
Facts: Four black
youths boarded a subway and one approached D and said “give me five
dollars.” D pulled out a pistol and
fired five shots, paralyzing one youth and wounding the others. He knew the youth did not have a gun. Pausing, he said “you seem to be all right,
here’s another,” and
shot him. D stated he would have
continued shooting if he had more bullets.
The GJ dismissed the charges of the indictment based on the prosecutor’s
alleged erroneous instructions that the conduct should be wholly
subjective. Appellate division affirmed.
Issue: Whether the D’s
conduct should be viewed in a subjective or objective state.
Rule: a person may use
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by
such other person.
Application: A jury
which believed a defendant’s testimony that he felt that his own actions were
warranted defies the ordinary meaning and significance of the term
“reasonably.”
To completely exonerate such an individual, no matter how
aberrational or bizarre his thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their
own standards for the permissible use of force.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Degree of Standard
State v. Wanrow p.480
Facts: D’s two
children were staying with Hooper. D’s
son came back and told Hooper that a man tried to grab him. Minutes later, the man (victim) came to the
house. Hooper’s daughter stating the man
also abused her. Hooper called the
police but they could not do anything until Monday. Hooper called D and other friends to slept
over. D came with a pistol. Two of the men went to victim’s house and
brought him back to Hooper’s where she shot him when he startled her. From jury conviction of murder 2nd,
D appealed.
Issue: Whether the
trial court errered when it instructed to consider
only those acts and circumstances occuring “at or
immediately before the killing”
Rule: The
justification of self-defense is to be evaluated in light of all the facts and
circumstances known to the defendant, including those known substantially
before the killing.
Application: Through
the persistent use of the masculine gender leaves the jury with the impression
the objective standard to be applied is that applicable to an altercation
between two men.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Battered Woman Syndrome
State v. Norman p.486
NC
Facts: A sheriff was
dispatched and found the deceased with two gunshot wounds to his head. D told him that her husband had been beating
her all day. And she shot him while he was sleeping. There had been a long history of abuse On the evening before, she stated she could
not take the abuse any longer On the day
of the murder, while at her mother’s house, she found a gun and went back to
her house and shot him.
Issue: Whether the TC
erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense.
Rule: D believe it necessary to kill the deceased in order to save
herself from death or great bodily harm calls for a subjective element. The second requirement is that D’s belief be
reasonable is measured in the objective standard.
Application: She fully
believed that he was invulnerable to the law and to all social agencies. A jury could find that decedent’s sleep was
but a momentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, that D
merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself, and that
defendant’s act was not without the provacation
required for self-defense.
Conclusion: The
evidence was sufficient to submit an issue of self-defense to he jury.
State v. Norman p.492
Application: The TC
properly declined to instruct the jury on the law relating to self-defense. Imminent death or great
bodily harm. The defendant had
ample time and opportunity to resort to other means of preventing further abuse
of her husband.
Conclusion: Reversed.
DISSENT: The proper
issue for this court is to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the D, was sufficient to require the TC to instruct on the
law of self-defense.
Defense of Others
Commonwealth v. Martin p.506
Mass
Facts: A stuggle erupted between two inmates and two guards. D left
his cell and saw officers beating an inmate.
He struck the officers. The judge
gave the jury no instructions on the subject of the priviledged
use of force to protect another.
Issue: Whether the
trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the D’s
claimed justification that the acts of which he was accused were part of an
attempt on his part to come to the aid of a fellow inmate.
Rule: An actor is
justified in using force against another to protect a third person when a) a
reasonable person in the actor’s postion would
believe his intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person
and b) in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be,
the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself.
Application: The
guard’s mere taking an inmate into custody or holding him in custody would not
be a proper occasion for intervening force.
Law Enforcement Defenses
People v. Ceballos p.510
Facts: D, rigged a spring gun at the door when he found pry marks
around the door. Two boys attempted to
enter and one was shot in the face. Jury
found D guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.
Issue: Was D justified
in shooting victim.
Rule: An assault is an
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on
the person of another.
Application: Where the
character and manner of the burglary do not reasonably create a fear of great
bodily harm, there is no cause for exaction of human life, or for the use of
deadly force.
Conclusion: Affirmed
Facts: Officers were
dispatched to a home that was being burglurized. Victim was climbing fence to get away and
officer shot him after yelling halt.
Father brought suit.
Issue: What is the
constitutionality of the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an
apparently unarmed suspected felon.
Rule: If, after notice
of the intention to arrest the D, he either flee or forcibly resist, the
officer may use all the necessary means to effect the
arrest.
Application: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of
all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable. Such force may not be used
unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others.
Conclusion: The
statute is invaild.
In common law all felonies were punishable by death;
therefore, the killing of a resisting or fleeing felon resulted in no greater
consequences than those authorized for punishment of the felony of which the
individual was charged.
Necessity
Commonwealth v. Leno p.526
Mass
Facts: Dispite state law prohibiting distro
of needles, D set up a needle exchange program.
D were charged, found guilty and appealed.
Issue: Did the TJ err
in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity.
Rule: Necessaity is: (1)
the D is faced with a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or
speculative; (2) the D can reasonably expect that his action will be effective
as the direct cause of abating the danger; (3) there is no legal alternative
which will be effective in abating the danger; and (4) the Legislature has not
acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the
values at issue.
Application: The
prevention of possible future harm does not excuse a current systematic
violation of the law in anticipation of the eventual over-all benifit to the public.
Conclusion: Affirmed
Civil Disobedience
United States v. Schoon p.534 US
Facts: D went into IRS
office and splashed fake blood because of tax dollars going to El Salvador.
Issue: Did the
district court deny D a necessity defense.
Rule: (1) they were
faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to
prevent imminent harm; (3) they reasonably anticipated a direct causal
relationship between their conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) they had
no legal alternatives to violating the law.
Application: Necessity
defense is inapplicable to cases involving indirect civil disobedience. The most immediate harm the appellants sought
to avert was the existence of the government’s El Salvador policy, which is not
in itself a legally cognizable harm.
Conclusion: Affirmed.
EXCUSE
Duress
United States v. Contento-Pachon p.553 US
Facts: Drug cartel
told D he had to swallow 129 balloons of cocaine and transport himself into the
US or his family would be murdered. At
trial the court excluded all evidence of duress.
Issue: Whether the D
presented enough evidence to support a claim of duress.
Rule: Three elements
of duresss: (1) an immediate threat
of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat
will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened
harm.
Application: He had
reason be believe the force would be carried out. A trier of fact should decide if D might
believe he had no reasonable opportunity of esacape.
Conclusion: Reversed.
Necessity v. Duress
People v. Unger p.561
Facts: D walked off
the prision yard because he claimed he was being
abused and threatened by other
Issue:
Rule:
Application:
Conclusion:
Two bad harms weighed against each other - forced to do one
Facts:
Issue:
Rule:
Application:
Conclusion:
Intoxication
Commonwealth v.
Facts:
Issue:
Rule:
Aplication:
Conclusion:
Involuntary Intoxication
City of
Facts:
Issue:
Rule:
Application:
Conclusion:
New Defenses
Addiction Defense
Robinson v.
Facts:
Issue:
Rule:
Apllication:
Conclusion:
THEFT
Larceny
Actus Reus
United States v. Mafnas p.946 US
Facts: Plaintiff was
convicted of stealing money from two banks.
He was a armored car driver who opened the bags
of money and stole.
Issues: Whether the
actions constituted larceny.
Rule: If a person
receives property for a limited or temporary purpose, he is only acquiring custody. His subsequent decision to keep the property
for himself would constitute larceny.
Application: Common
law larceny requires a trespassory taking. The plaintiff argues he had lawful possession
of the bags, with the consent of the banks, when he took the money. It was beyond the consent of the owner who
retained constructive possession.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment affirmed
If the armored car service was the possessor, the defendant
would still be guilty because the bailment or possession was of the bags
themselves and not the contents.
Rex v. Chisser p.946 Emgland
Facts: Defendant came to a shop and asked to see a
product. When it was handed to him, he
offered less than it was worth and ran off.
Issues: Whether this be felony.
Application: The goods were delivered but not out of the
possession of the plaintiff.
Conclusion/Holding:
This act is felony.
Topolewski v. State p.950
Wisc
Facts: The accused was
charged with stealing three barrels of meat.
They set out four barrels for the defendant to drive up and take away
during normal business hours. Employees
openly watched as the defendant took the barrels and told the warehouse keeper
to bill him.
Issues: Whether a
person can be guilty of larceny if the victim helps or aids the accused and
gives possession.
Application: The
setting of the trap must not go further than to afford the would-be thief the
amplest opportunity to carry out his purpose.
Conclusion/Holding: If
the owner of the property aids in the commission of the offense the would-be
criminal is not guilty of all the elements of the offense.
NOTES:
State the reasoning and not only the rules.
Rex v. Pear
p.953 England
Facts: The defendant
was indicted for stealing a horse. The
horse was hired to take a journey and the defendant sold him the same day.
Issues: Whether the
delivery of the horse had changed the possession of the property as to render
the subsequent conversion of it a mere breach of trust, or whether the
conversion was felonious?
Application: The parting with the property had not changed
the nature of the possession, but that it remained unaltered at the time of the
conversion.
Conclusion/Holding:
The prisoner was therefore guilty of felony.
Brooks v. State p.954 Ohio
Facts: Plaintiff was
convicted of larceny for stealing $200 in bank bills. Plaintiff found a bank roll on the
street. The plaintiff did not tell
anyone, instead moved his family out of town and spent the money.
Issues: Under what
circumstances does the property become the subject of larceny by the finder.
Rule: The title of the
property still remains the owner unless the circumstances were such as to show
that it had been abandoned by the owner.
Application: Before
the finder can be guilty of larceny, the intent to steal the property must have
existed at the time he took it into his possession.
Conclusion/Holding: No
ground for interfering with the action of the court below.
Lund v. Commonwealth
p. 957 Virg
Facts: Defendant was
charged with the theft of keys, computer stuff and the use of the
computer. He was working on hid doctoral
dissertation and needed the use of a computer.
The unauthorized time spent on the computer was billed to different
areas of the school. He was found guilty
of grand larceny
Issues: Was the
computer time and services subject of larceny under the code.
Rule: For one to be
guilty of the crime of larceny he must obtain from another
person money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, with
the intent to defraud.
Application: Defendant
could not be convicted of grand larceny because there was no evidence that
those articles were stolen and that they had a market value of $100 or
more.
Conclusion/Holding:
Judgment reversed.
At common law, labor or services could not be the subject of
the crime of false pretense because neither time nor services may be taken and
carried away.
Mens Rea
People v. Brown p.960
Facts: Seventeen year
old boy took bike from house without intention to keep it.
Issues: Whether the
court erred in giving the jury instructions stating the defendant was guilty
even if he did not intend to deprive the victim of the bicycle prementantly.
Rule: The rule of
larceny states you must have the intent to deprive the victim permanently.
Conclusion/Holding:
This instruction is erroneous, and demands a reversal of the judgement.
People v.
Facts: Defendant entered store with shopping bag. He took a shirt off the rack and went to the
refund counter to exchange it for cash.
Surveillance personal saw the transaction and ordered down to the
cashier to give him a exchange credit voucher. Defendant was arrested as he walked away from
the counter. Issues:
Whether this is larceny.
Rule: The elements of
larceny: (1) takes possession (2) of
personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass
and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries it away.
Intent to steal may be found when (1)
When the defendant intends to sell the item back to its owner, (2) when the
defendant intends to claim a reward for finding the property, and (3) when the
defendant intends to return the property to its owner for a refund.
Application: Defendant contends that he had no intention to
permanently deprive the store of the shirt.
The store consented to the issuance of the voucher with full knowledge
of how he came into possession of the shirt.
A self-service store consents to a customer’s
picking up and handling an item displayed for sale and carrying it from the
display area to a sales counter with the intent of purchasing it. (The credit voucher was entrapped to him and
the credit voucher was an merger of the shirt;
therefore, the whole act was entrapped.
The shirt was not carried away because the customer has free reign with
regards to transporting the shirt inside the store)
Conclusion/Holding:
Based on the above rules, the judgment is affirmed.
Embezzlement
Rex v. Bazeley p.968
Facts: The defendant,
as a bank teller, received bank-notes from a customer for deposit. He placed the notes in his pocket.
Issues: Whether the
possession of the servant was, under the circumstances of this case, the
possession of the master.
Rule: A breach of
trust cannot, the rules of the common law, be converted into a felonious
taking.
Application: It was never in their custody or under the
control of the bank. If, at the very
time he received the note, he had no intent to steal it, it is no felony.
Conclusion/Holding: Pardon.
NOTES:
Contructive (justice would allow) possession