4LawSchool.com Outlines Bank

Author: Michael A. Paff
School
: Rutgers- Newark

Professor: Dean Deutch
 

 

Johnson v. M’Intosh  p.25 US

Facts: An Indian tribe sold a plot of land to Johnson.  Thirty years later, the U.S. gave M’Intosh the same piece of land. Johnson was thrown off the land.  Johnson sued M’Intosh for a ejectment cause of action.

Issues:  Whether the title given by the Indians can be recognized in the Courts of the US.

Rule: The decree of 1763 stated that no one could purchase land from an Indian because the land was not theirs, it belonged to the government. 

Application: Either because of the state of conquering of the decree of 1763, the Indian government, could not sell the land to the Johnson therefore it was like the sale never took place.

Conclusion/Holding: Judgment for Defendant

 

NOTES:

Ejectment cause for action.  (gets trespassers off)

Decree of 1763 gave no right to Indians to sell property

 

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States  p.36 US

Facts:  The tribe wanted compensation for the taking of certain timber by the United States from Alaskan lands allegedly belonging to the group.

Issues:  Whether the tribe has the right to unrestricted possession, occupation and use.

Application:  There has been no recognition by Congress of any legal rights in petitioner to the land in question.  Indian occupation of land without government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by the United States.

Conclusion/Holding:  Indian occupancy may be extinguished without compensation. 

 

 

Pierson v. Post  p.51 NY

Facts:  While Post was hunting and pursuing a fox with dogs, Pierson intercepted the fox, killed it, and carried it off.  From a trial court decision for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.  

Issues:  Whether Post, by his pursuit, acquired such a right to, or property in, the fox.

Rule: Property in such animals is acquired by occupancy only.  Pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman unless the animal is actually taken.

Application: Mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox.

Conclusion/Holding: Judgment reversed

Dissent:  Kill all foxes.  If hunted professionally, it should go to pursuer. 

 

NOTES:

Form of action - trespass on the case (deals with personal property with a specific remedy (money)

 

 

 

Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.   p.56  Tex

Facts:  Both parties owned property over a huge gas reservoir in which drilling rigs were established.  The defendant’s rig blow out and destroyed property of the plaintiff. 

Issues:  Whether the law of capture absolves respondents of any liability for the negligent waste or destruction of petitioners’ gas and distillate.

Rule: The landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land.  Under the law of capture, there is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the common pool.

Application: The negligent waste and destruction of petitioners’ gas was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from beneath their lands nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of them.  Consequently, the petitions did not lose their right, title, and interest in them under the law of capture

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment reversed

 

NOTES: 

Surface owner is the owner of the land and also the absolute owner of the oil and gas below.

The law of capture modifies by allowing a producer to become the owner of the oil; not trespasser.

Can’t use injurious capture/drilling - liable if do so

That rule modified by negligence - must capture - if not - just waste - no law of capture.

 

Water: natural situation prevails - surface water system

                streams/groundwater - prior appropriation/use - 1st user owns

                permit system - state/organizations gives permits

riparian owner

reasonable use - balance rights of all

correlative rights - defined water for each user

                free use/absolute ownership - creates conflicts

 

International News Service v. Associated Press  p.66 US

Facts:  INS waits for AP to release its stories on a community bulletin board or a newspaper, then steals the idea and sells it to other newspapers.  From a judgment for AP, INS appeals. 

Issues:  Whether defendant may lawfully be restrained from appropriating news taken from or from newspapers published by them, for the purpose of selling it to defendant’s clients.

Rule:  Upon the publication of news, property right is lost and may be regarded as public knowledge.  Each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of another.

Application: AP remains the owner of the stories after they are published as far as their competition is concerned.  This is unfair competition in business

Conclusion/Holding:  Affirmed.

Dissent #1:  Property does not arise from value.  The defendant should be enjoined from publishing news obtained from the AP for hours after publication by the plaintiff unless it gives express credit to the AP.

Dissent #2:  An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.  They are merely using its product without making compensation.  That they have a legal right to do, because the product is not property.  INS should be able to use stories only if they do not credit AP.  Legislatures should deal with this problem and create laws.

 

Moore v. Regents of the University of California   p.82  Cal

Facts:  Doctors, who were treating Moore for leukemia, used his blood, semen, bone marrow, and spleen unknown to Moore to come up with the lucrative “Mo cell line.” Moore found out and now wants compensation.

Issues:  Whether it was a breach of fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent.

Rule:  Conversion.

Application:  The complaint does not satisfy the established requirements of a conversion cause of action.  The cell line was new and different from the plaintiff’s cells. 

Conclusion/Holding:  Should be left to Legislature.

Dissent:  The complaint fully satisfies the established requirements for a conversion cause of action.

 

 

Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom  p.136  Alaska

Facts:  From 1944 to 1978 D used, staked, and improved a cabin.  From a denial for P’s directed verdict, P appealed.

Issues:  Whether the jury could reasonably conclude that the Fagerstroms adversely possessed the parcel.

Rule:  For the statutory period ‘his use of the land was continuous, open  and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true owner.’

Application: The defendants cared for the parcel as if they owned it.  A quick investigation of the premises would have been sufficient to place a reasonably diligent landowner on notice that someone may have been exercising dominion and control over their property. 

Conclusion/Holding:  We conclude that the defendants adversely possed property.

 

 

Where, as in the present case, the land is rural, a lesser exercise of dominion and control may be reasonable.

 

Where physical visibility is established, community repute is also relevant evidence that the true owner was put on notice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOTES:

The requirements:

actual - take and use the property as if it were yours {may be easement if you just use it}

continuous - be there physically

exclusive - keep trespassers off the land like what a owner would normally do

open and notorious - needs to be sufficient warning to the public that a claim is being asserted

hostile (intend to deprive the owner)(adverse) /under claim of right (could have a deed) / under color of title for statutory (have document that intends to give you the property, may decrease time needed)

                One objective test used, or

                Two subjective tests used:

Intentional dispossession - the adverse possessor must be aware that she is occupying

property owned by someone else and must intend to oust the true owner.

                                Good Faith - those who mistakenly occupied property owned by someone else.

statutory period (tacking) - 21 years in England and still used in some states.  Western states are easier to get AP (5 years in shortest).  NJ is 20 years but drops the element of permission for 30 years in developed land (60 years in undeveloped land).

[pay taxes in some states] - some states require that you paid the property taxes during the AP claim.

 

Can not gain adverse possession when you are given permission to occupy the land.

 

Reasons for AP:

1.     Land development

2.     Distribution of wealth.

3.     Keep land claims alive (Doctrine of repose)

 

Burden of proof belongs to the AP

Standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence (preponderance of the evidence is commonly the same but the court distinguishes here)

 

Community Feed Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp.     p.169  Vt

Facts:  P sought a prescriptive easement for a parcel of land 60 X 90 feet owned by the D.  Vehicles would use the gravel lot for turning and backing while delivering goods to both the P and D.  Finding for the D, P appealed. 

Issues:  Whether the court erred in making two findings of fact. First, if the plaintiff failed to prove the size of the easement, and secondly, the use of the area was made with the permission of the fee owner.

Rule: Slight deviations from the accustomed route will not defeat an easement, only substantial changes which break the continuity of the course to travel.

Application: The traveling of trucks entering the easement had only slight deviations.  Plaintiff met its burden by establishing the general outlines of the easement with reasonable certainty. 

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment reversed. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

 


                                                                                                                                       -----Gravel area in question

   

                                                                                                   Feed

                                                                                    NCC                    Store

 

 

 

 

 

Acquiescence - acting like you have possession as the owner (mindset of actual owner), different from permissive

 

The requirements for easements are generally the same but are more lapse in most states.

 

Brown v. Gobble    p.141  WV

Facts:  D purchased their property by deed and were informed that there property ran up to a fence, when, in actuality, the two-foot-wide tract of land belonged to the P.  The D took care of the P and refused to let the P build on the property once the truth was known.  The P sued and won and the D appealed based on tacking.

Rule: Where one by mistake occupies land up to a line beyond his actual boundary, believing it to be the true line, such belief will not defeat his right to claim that he holds such land adversely or hostility under the doctrine of AP.

Application:  The land appeared to be part of the defendant’s property.  They contend that they have established adverse possession by tacking on the time periods that their predecessors in title claimed the two-feet-wide tract.

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment reversed.

 

Charrier v. Bell    p.115  LA

Facts:  P excavated  two tons of Indian artifacts.  The TC denied relief under the theory of unjust enrichment.  P appealed.

Issues:   The adequacy of proof that the Tunica-Biloxi tribe are descendants of the inhabitants of the burial grounds, the ownership of the artifacts, and the applicability of the theory of unjust enrichment.

Application:  The descendants of former Tunica Indians have adequately satisfied the proof of descent.  The fact that the descendants resolved to bury certain items along with the bodies of the deceased, does not result in a conclusion that the goods were abandoned.  As for the unjust enrichment; plaintiff has failed to prove that he has sustained the type of impoverishment needed.

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment affirmed.

 

NOTES: 

Declamatory relief

Grave robbing case

He claims he dug up buried treasure.  The items were not gold and silver or stolen goods and therefore distinctive.

Mr. Hoshman did not have the authority to allow access to the property, therefore the defendant was a trespasser.

 

Items can be either lost, mislaid, or abandoned

 

 

State v. Shack N.J.  p186

Facts:  Tedesco, a farmer who hires migrant workers, called police when defendants, Tejeras and Shack walked onto his property to check on a injured worker and a worker who needed legal advise. 

Issues:  Whether the migrant worker should be deemed to be a tenant and thus entitled to the tenant’s right to receive visitors or whether his residence on the employer’s property should be deemed to be merely incidental and in the aid of his employment.

 Rule:  Representatives from charities may enter upon the premises to seek out the worker at his living quarters.  

Application:  The migrant worker must be allowed to receive visitors there of his own choice, so long as there is no behavior hurtful to others.  The farmer is entitled to pursue his farming activities without interference but he cannot assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in any respect significant for the worker’s well being.

Conclusion/Holding:  The defendants did not violate the trespassing statue.  Judgment reversed.

 

Notes: 

$100,000 in attorney’s fee in a NJ appeal.

Property rights serve human values.  Human rights are higher than property rights in NJ. (liberal)

The key is communication to the farmworkers.

Most justices say that property rights have changed over time.

 

Lloyd Corp., Ltd. V. Tanner    U.S.   p236

Facts:  Lloyd Corp., owner, made the D stop distributing handbills.  The DC found the Center was equivalent to a public business district and that their rules violated First Amendment rights.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues:  Whether respondents, in the exercise of asserted First Amendment rights, may distribute handbills on Lloyd’s private property contrary to its wishes and contrary to a policy enforced against all handbilling.

Rule:  The Constitution does not require private property to be used for public use, nor does it lose its private character because the public is invited to use it.     

Application:  Marsh v. Alabama involved a company-owned town that had the full spectrum of powers of a  State municipality. There is no such dedication of Lloyd’s privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights. 

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment reversed.

 

DISSENTING:  In Marsh, “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more so his rights of those who use it”.  It is a balance we are striking between freedom of speech and freedom of private property. 

 

N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Reality Group  N.J.  p243

Facts:  The respondent petitioned 10 large malls to hand out anti-war leaflets.  TJ found for Ds and AJ affirmed.

Issues:  Whether the defendant regional and community shopping centers must permit leafleting on social issues.

Rule:  Constitution affords no general right to free speech in privately owned shopping centers. 

Application:  Regional malls compete with and have displaced downtown business districts as the gathering point of citizens.  The New Jersey Constitution’s right to free speech is broader than the First Amendment. The court contended that leafleting would not hurt the business of the mall as it did not for downtown businesses. 

Conclusion/Holding:  We decide that the defendant’s rules prohibiting leafleting violate plaintiff’s free speech rights. 

DISSENTING:  The primary users of shopping malls are shoppers.  It is a business.  Some groups would offend shoppers.  

 

NOTES: 

Mall owners wanted to keep it peaceful for shoppers.

 

 

Green Party of New Jersey and James Mohn v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc.

Facts:  Plaintiff, wanted to leaflet Hartz.  The mall wanted him to follow three regulations.  1.  Get a $1,000,000 insurance policy.  2.  Sign a “hold harmless” clause, and  3.  Only one day per year.  The premium for the insurance policy was $665 which was cost prohibitive.  P filed suit and was allowed to leaflet one day without insurance. The Chancery Division ruled all three regulations were invalid.  AC held that all three regulations were good faith.

Issues:  What legal standard should determine free speech activities at shopping centers.

Rule:  Peaceful leafleting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. 

Application:  Regional malls compete with and have displaced downtown business districts as the gathering point of citizens.  The court observed that property rights must yield to the public interests.

Conclusion/Holding:  We disagree that the business judgment rule is the proper standard

 DISSENTING:  The primary users of shopping malls are shoppers.  It is a business.  Some groups would offend shoppers. 

 

NOTES:

Empire State, World Trade Center

Stadium

Home Depot

 

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association  N.J.   p.258

Facts: D owned six out of 76 parcels of oceanfront land.  They lease the other parcels from private landowners.  D owns the land commencing at the end of seven of these streets for the width of each street and extending through the upper dry sand to the mean water line.  It charges residents $60 to $90 per year for membership.     

Issues: Whether the public has a right to use the dry sand area owned by a quasi-public body.

Rule: Land covered by tidal waters belongs to the sovereign, but for the common use of all people.

Application:  The public must be able to have access to the beach as well as the dry area.  The complete pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods of rest and relaxation beyond the water’s edge.  The Association’s activities paralleled those of a municipality in its operation of the beachfront.  There is no public beach.

Conclusion/Holding:  The public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas

 

 

Noone v. Price   (W. Va. 1982)  p.286

Facts:  The Ps purchased a home and four years later they became aware that the wall under their front porch was giving way and that the living room plaster had cracked.  The defendant owned a retaining wall built on the bottom of the hill.

Issues:  Whether the defendant was negligent in failing to provide lateral support for their home.

Rule: An adjacent landowner is strictly liable for acts of commission and omission on his part that result in the withdrawal of lateral support to his neighbor’s property; however, there is no obligation to support structures that land cannot naturally support.

Application:  One who removes natural lateral support and substitutes artificial support to replace it, have an obligation to maintain it.  The defendant merely had the obligation to maintain the wall to support the plaintiff’s land in its natural condition.

Conclusion/Holding:  Remanded for further hearing. 

 

NOTES:

case took 14 years  (NY average 7 years)

 

Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc.    (Tex. 1978)  p.299

Facts:  P alleges damage from D’s past and continuing withdraws of vast quantities of underground water from wells on defendants’ nearby lands.  Plaintiff sues on negligence and nuisance.

Issues:  Whether the defendant is liable for subjacent support to the plaintiff.

Rule:  Owners have absolute ownership over their property.  Law of capture except when wasteful.

Application: P argue for the reasonable use rule. Only waste and malice are limitations to the absolute ownership rule.

Conclusion/Holding:  Holding against the plaintiff.

Dissent:  This is a nuisance case.  The plaintiffs assert an absolute right to keep the surface of their land at its natural horizon.  The plaintiff does have a right to lateral support.

 

NOTES: 

Building codes may not a cause of action to support a law suits.  In these cases, common law is used.

 

 

 

Page County Appliance Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.    (Iowa 1984)  p.325

Facts:  P owned and operated an appliance store with radiation leaking computers next door.  P sued Honeywell and ITT for nuisance and tortuous interference with business relations. J for the plaintiff, defendants appeal. 

Issues:  Whether the court erred in not addressing the issue of unusually sensitive areas. 

Rule: The plaintiff cannot, by devoting his own land to an unusually sensitive use…make a nuisance out of conduct of the adjoining defendant which would otherwise be harmless.

Application:  To balance the issue of unusually sensitive area, the trier of fact needs to look at certain uses.  The existence of a nuisance is not affected by the intention of its creator not to injury anyone.

Conclusion/Holding:  The court on retrial should provide more guidance for the jury.  Judgment reversed.

 

NOTES:

Nuisance per se - Certain businesses in residential areas; funeral homes, sewer plant

 

Nuisance in fact (per accident) - certain acts that are a nuisance

 

Private nuisance - only affects a small number of people

 

Public nuisance - harm to society in general or large numbers of people

 

Nuisance - unreasonable use of the land which causes substantial harm

 

Proper remedy - injunction; damages

 

Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.    (Fla. 1959)  p.336

Facts:  P brought suit because D started to build an addition to their hotel that would have shadowed the P’s resort hotel.

Issues:  Plaintiff claims right to negative easement

Rule:  The landowner had no legal right, in the absence of an easement, to unobstructed light and air from the enjoining land.

Application: Where a structure serves a useful and beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either for damages or for an injunction, even though it causes injury to another by cutting off the light and air and interfering with the view that would otherwise be available. 

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment reversed. 

 

 


                                                    PLAINTIFF

 

 


                                                    Proposed Building

 

 


                                                  Defendant

 

 

 

Prah v. Maretti    (Wis. 1982)  p.357

Facts:  D built his house next door to the P’s solar powered home.

Issues:  Whether a construction of a residence interferes with his access to an unobstructed path for sunlight across the neighbor’s property.

Rule:  Private nuisance common law: 

1.     The right of landowners to use their property as they wished, as long as they did not cause physical damage to a neighbor.

2.     Sunlight was valued only for aesthetic enjoyment or as illumination.

3.     Society had a significant interest in not restricting or impeding land development.

Application:   Private nuisance law has the flexibility to protect both a landowner’s right of access to sunlight and another landowner’s right to develop land.  Recognition of a nuisance claim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight will not prevent land development or unduly hinder the use of adjoining land.  Access to sunlight has taken on a new significance in recent years.  A landowner’s compliance with zoning laws does not automatically bar a nuisance claim.

Conclusion/Holding:   Judgment reversed.

Dissent:  A landowner’s right to use his property within the limits of ordinances, statues, and restrictions of record where such use is necessary to serve his legitimate needs is a fundamental precept of a free society which this court should strive to uphold. 

 

Holbrook v. Taylor     (Ky. 1976)  p.382

Facts:  The A gave permission to D to use the road for eight years.  The right to the use of this easement was not established by prescription.   The appellee came to the Taylors and offered the easement for sale for $500.  The Taylor rejected the offer.  The appellee then blocked the road to discontinue use to the appellants.

Issues:  Whether an easement by estoppel (Irrevocable License) could be established.

Application: There is no other location over which a roadway could reasonably be built to provide an outlet for appellees.  D used to road to get to their home, construction of the residence, and improvement of the road.

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment affirmed.

 

 

 

Rase v. Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc.     (Mont. 1981)  p.385

Facts:  The P owned homes around lake purchased by D who wants to kick them out.  P had a license agreement with the prior owner.  The court entered judgment for a constructive trust.  Both sides appeal. 

Issues:  Whether the agreement between the cabin owners and Tavenner entitled the owners to an irrevocable license.

Application: Tavenner misled the cabin owners into believing they did not have to fear the loss of their investment and so allowed them to act to their detriment.

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment affirmed.  Payment or ingress and egress.

 

A-----------ŕ------B--------ŕ-----------C (equitable owner)

               title                  beneift    

 

license coupled with an interest

 

Irrevocable license terminates when the use terminates

An easement does not terminate from nonuse. 

Constructive trusts are not required in writing.

 

 

Granite Property Limited Partnership v. Manns    (Ill.1987)  p.396

Facts:  D bought a parcel from the P who maintains two easements for access purposes.  The D admitted that he saw the two easements before he purchased the property.  Form a judgment for the P, D appealed.

Issues:  Did the plaintiff acquire an easement by implied reservation over the driveways of the defendant?

Rule:  There are two types of easements - easement by necessity and the easement implied from a pre-existing use.

An easement implied from pre-existing use has three elements:

1.     common ownership of parcel then a transfer separating the ownership

2.     before separation, the common owner used part of the parcel for the benefit of another part, and the use was apparent, obvious, continuous, and permanent and

3.     the claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel conveyed by the grantor. 

Application: Easements were apparent, permanent, and subject to continuous, uninterrupted, and actual use and reasonably necessary for the beneficial use and enjoyment of the shopping center and the apartment complex. 

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment affirmed.

 

Easements - express

                     prescription

                     by implication (quasi-easement) (by reservation or by grant)

                     by necessity

 

appurtenant

in gross

 

dominant estate (tenement); servient estate (tenement);

 

actual notice

inquiry notice

constructive notice

 

 

 

 

Finn v. Williams      (Ill.1941)  p.403

 

Facts:  Ps charge that the nearest and only available means of egress from and ingress to their land to a highway is by means of a right of way over D’s tract.  Ps must now walk, with their livestock, to the nearest road

Issues:  Whether P has an easement by necessity over the defendant.

Rule: Where an owner of land conveys a parcel thereof which has no outlet to a highway except over the remaining lands of the grantor or over the land of strangers, a way by necessity exists over the remaining lands of the grantor.

Conclusion/Holding:  Judgment for the plaintiff.

 

 

Green v. Lupo     (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)  p.415

Facts:  The D purchased parcel from Ps.  The P agreed to a deed release to a small section in return for the promise of an easement along the southern border of their land.  P used the easement as a practice runway for their motorcycles.  The court ordered the plaintiff’s use to be limited to ingress and egress for their own home and prohibited the passage of motorcycles.  Plaintiffs appeal. 

Application: In this case the easement was appurtenant.  A servient owner is entitled to impose reasonable restraints on a right of way to avoid a greater burden on the servient owner’s estate so long as such restraints do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant owner’s use.

Conclusion/Holding:  Reversed and remanded so not to create a dangerous nuisance.