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Connecticut
v. Doehr, U.S. Supreme Court (1991)
Author: Bram
Cause
of action: The following is a cause of action for damages as
the result of an assault and battery.
Procedural
History: Doehr filed suit in a federal district court,
claiming the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment. District Court upheld the constitutionality of
CT statute and granted summary judgment to DiGiovanni Upon
appeal to the 2nd Circuit, a split panel reversed.
Facts:
At the time of the original suit, DiGiovanni submitted to the
court an application for $75K prejudgment attachment on Doehr's
home, which was authorized by CT statute. The statute in
question requires a motion by PL if there exist "probable
cause to sustain the validity of the PL's claims" and that
the property over which attachment is being sought be real
property, There was no requirement that PL post a bond for
the payment of damages arising from the attachment if the PL
should lose, or to pay off successful wrongful attachment lawsuit
brought later by DF.
DiGiovanni
brought up the probable cause issue in his affadavit, which was
agreed by the court, which issued a prejudgment attachment order.
Following this order, DiGiovanni was ordered to then give notice
to DF Doehr advising him the right to
(1)
object to the attachment order for lack of p/c; (2) request the
order be modified, vacated, dismissed, or that a bond be
substituted in lieu of the lien; or (3) object to a portion of
the property claimed to be exempt from the prejudgment order.
Issue(s):
Under federal rules of civil procedure, is a state statute that
authorizes prejudgment attachment of real estate without
prior notice or hearing, without a showing of extraordinary
circumstances, and without a requirement that the person seeking
the attachment post a bond, satisfactory according to the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?
Court's
Rationale/Reasoning: Previous case law in the Court shows
they have not favored pre-judgment attachment hearings when there
is not exigent circumstances where the PL might feel there is a
good chance they might lose any possible monetary awards from
DF's taking them away or using them all up. The Court also
feels pre-attachment hearings are violative of due process when
there is no notice prior to the actual filing of the attachment,
for DF has no remedy to object to the suspension of his property
rights.
(1)
Property interests are significant. Liens on them affect
the value of property and ability to sell them, as well as
tainting credit rating. Even temporary or partial
impairments are sufficient to merit due process protection.
(2)
Probable cause is very subjective means of determining whether or
not to file an attachment to the suit. The interest is
solely with the PL, and only PL gets to tell their side of the
story, further hindering due process.
(3)
The government's interest in protecting the rights of PL cannot
be any more weighty then those rights themselves, and here they
are di minimus.
(4)
Common law only favors pre-attachment in exigent circumstances,
and here CT's statute does nothing of the sort to elaborate on
that issue, nor does the case-at-bar have a scintilla of
information relating to the possibility that there is an exigent
circumstance involved.
Rule:
Three part test established in Mathews, and extended in this
case, to determine when prejudgment remedy decisions to determine
what process is due when the government itself seeks to effect a
deprivation on its own initiative:
(1)
the private interest that will be affected by the official action
(2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addition or
substitute safeguards
(3)
principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the
prejudgment remedy (pulled from this case)
Holding:
No. The prejudgment order exceeded the parameters of the
test. "by failing to provide a pre-attachment hearing
without at least requiring a showing of some exigent
circumstance, clearly falls short of the demands of due
process."
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