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Horowitz
(law firm for pyramid scheme guy) v. Laske (investor), 4th DCA
Florida (2003)
Author: Bram
Cause
of action: The following is a cause of action for evaluating
the pleas before the court after remand from a higher court
ordered the causes of action stated in the complaint and
elaborated upon in a pre-trial brief. (Wendt originally
wanted indemnity from Horowitz)
Procedural
History: This case comes back on remand from the FL Supreme
Court to answer the question presented. On remand the
briefs were to also identify the tort involved and to state what
ultimate facts pleaded in the complaint satisfied those elements,
as per FL RCP 1.110(b)(2).
Count
7: contribution; count 8: indemnification; count 9: wrongful act
doctrine.
Facts:
(previous history) Trinh used a pyramid scheme in which he had
others go out and get high interest prom notes to finance his
produce business. Trinh retained Horowitz as his attorney,
who is based out of MI. Horowitz advised everyone that
these were not securities (even though in essence they were).
Those three were investigated under the Office of the
Comptroller, who was told the same thing Horowitz told the
suitors for investors. Soon enough, investors sued Wendt,
who in turn sued Horowitz, who was allegedly given the wrong
information on the phone and in letters from MI.
Issue(s):
Under FL rule of civil procedure, were the threshold
determinations for Wendt's 3rd-party complaint against Horowitz
satisfied in stating a cause of action, and if so, did the cause
of action arise out of communications Horowitz made into Florida?
Court's
Rationale/Reasoning: To state a cause of action for legal
malpractice, PL must show (1) attorney's employment, (2)
attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the attorney's
negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the
client. This liability is restricted to those parties who
they have privity of contract with. Wendt's allegation he
was one of those people is a conclusory statement which does not
prove a properly pleaded complaint.
The
fact a person is aware of an agent doesn't make that person owed
a duty to Wendt. There was also no facts pleaded regarding
the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty. Wendt never
proved he was privy to the advice Horowitz gave Trinh or to the
statements Horowitz made to state regulators.
As
for the right to contribution, it is a statutory remedy meant to
apportion the responsibility to pay innocent injured third
parties between or among those causing the injury. To state
a claim for contribution, the claimant must allege a common
liability to the injured party. There are no ultimate facts
which would show that Horowitz is liable to the investors.
As
to count 9, there must be a special relationship between the
parties that gives rise to the technical liability of the
would-be indemnitee. But Wendt failed to allege ultimate
facts showing a special relationship between him and Horowitz
that would make Wendt technically liable for wrong acts on the
part of Horowitz.
Horowitz
also alleges the wrongful act doctrine, which is acknowledged as
not an independent action. When DF has committed a wrong
toward PL and the wrongful act has caused PL to litigate with
third persons, the wrongful act doctrine permits PL to recover as
an additional element of damages, their third party litigation
expenses. Since this is a claim for special damages under
malpractice, and no malpractice cause of action was pleaded,
count 9 is not properly plead.
Rule:
FL RCP 1.11o(b)(2): "Claims for Relief. A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim must state a cause
of action and shall contain: (2) a short and plain statement of
the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."
The
privity requirement has been relaxed where it was the apparent
intent of the client to benefit a third party.
Holding:
No. Appellee Wendt (and Laske) failed to meet the
requirements for establishing a tort cause of action of
malpractice, and b/c there is no cause of action established,
there is no personal jurisdiction.
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