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In
Re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 3rd
Circuit (1999)
Author: Bram
Cause
of action: The following is a class action cause of action
for false and misleading statements (fraud).
Procedural
History: District Court granted dismissal for failure to
adhere to the guidelines of FRCP 9(b) and of the Private
Securities Reform Act of 1995. (the D.C. also, after
dismissing the 3 claims, gave PL's 30 days to amend their
complaints which they failed to do, instead deciding to stand on
their old complaint. Judge denied PL's request.) This
court affirms.
Facts:
The allegations of false and misleading statements base come from
a $20M loss the company announced 3/17/97. PL's claim
company failed to disclose its change in practice of raising
initial interest rates on new credit card holders to a specific
amount. Two statements (Point and Alter) allegedly
contradict one another as to the raised rate. Three others
pointed the company in a "positive portrayal", which,
in combination with the other two, resulted in the detrimental
reliance of PL stockholders to purchase Advanta stock or not to
sell the stock they had.
Issue(s):
Under FRCP 9(b), did PL's properly plead their cause of action of
false and misleading statements by alleging the statements were
enough to specifically give rise to the possibility DF could be
found liable?
Court's
Rationale/Reasoning: Scienter for Reform Act for pleading
requirements: must have a strong inference DF acted as to the
charge by showing motive and an opportunity to do so or facts
consisting of circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior. DF's argue the Reform Act establishes a
pleading standard which is more stringent than the above 2nd
Circuit standard, that being specifying each statement along with
the reasons they are misleading, and full particularity of all
facts relating to an accusation.
The
court believes in regards to the scienter aspect, the Reform Act
resembles the pleading standard set forth by the 2nd Circuit, as
it is "echoed by FRCP 9(b)." However, the
pleading requirement under the Reform Act is a raised standard,
and the one that applies.
The
Point statement is not held under the standard of safe-harbor, as
it was a forward looking statement, which is okay unless there is
an intent to defraud or mislead. The accusation under this
protection is too broad to call under scope, so it does not pass
muster under this test. PL's argue the Alter statement,
which allegedly contradicts Point's statement, prove the
allegations b/c Point, as company spokesperson, likely had actual
knowledge of the lower raised rates, or even if she didn't know
the company did and approved her statements by silence.
However,
the standard for review of the pleading is not reached, as there
are no specific facts to support an inference that Point or any
other employee of DF had knowledge of her statement's falsity.
The only thing that's true is the statement itself.
As
for the positive portrayal statements, under the Act, liability
does not attach when statements are contradictory of one another.
There must be factual proof to support these allegations,
identifying the statements were knowingly made, or at the very
least, a "should have known" standard. The
reckless standard also is raised here to a level which is of
"extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care...presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
known to DF (or they should have known)." None of the
allegations do any such thing; at the most they represent an
aggressive business policy.
As
to the last allegation, the court held there was no strong
inference of scienter (knowledge) required by the Reform Act.
Rule:
When fraud allegations do not specifically point to proof of such
an allegation, then the scienter is not proven. When the
scienter is not proven, there is no pleading which can be
accepted by a court of law. See FRCP 9(b)
Holding:
No. The Point statement was protected by the safe-harbor
provision, and the remaining claims in count I failed to comply
with the pleading requirements of the Reform Act, and the last 2
claims are derivative of the first. Thus the claims were
properly dismissed.
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