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Dowling
v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990)
Author: Anonymous
Facts:
A man wearing a ski mask, armed with a small gun robbed a Bank in
St. Croix. A witness saw the man after he removed his mask
in a taxi and identified him at trial. Prior to the 3rd
trial, the Df was acquitted after a trial for burglary.
During that case the victim identified the Df as being the
accomplice with Delroy Christian, after she struggled with him
and his mask was removed. The govt introduced her testimony
to link the description of the person wearing the mask with the
Df, and to link him with Delroy. The police had saw Delroy
and another man in a white car in front of the bank just before
the robbery. The judge instructed the jury as to the
limited use of her testimony and the Df’s acquittal.
Issue:
Whether the introduction of evidence of a prior, unrelated crime,
that resulted in an acquittal, was barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause–collateral estoppel?
Holding:
No
Procedure:
Two trial, one hung and the other conviction reversed on appeal—then
during the third jury trial Df was convicted and sentenced to 70
years. Ct of App affirmed. S. Ct. Affirmed
Rule:
In the FRE 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only
if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and
that the defendant was the actor.
Rationale:
Because a jury might conclude the Df was the masked man who
entered the home, even if they did not believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Df committed the crime charged, the
collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
inapposite. The Df failed to demonstrate that his acquittal
represented a jury determination that he was not one of the men
who entered the home. The burden is on the Df to show that
the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually
decided in the first proceeding. The trial judge, in
discussing this fact with the Df’s atty stated that the Df
“was not acquitted on the issue of identification.”
In
light of the limiting instructions, the introduction of the
witness’s testimony does not violate “fundamental
conceptions of fairness” which define “the community’s
sense of fair play and decency.”
Dissent:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel “means simply that when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and
final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit.” (quoting Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). In a criminal case,
collateral estoppel prohibits the Government from re-litigating
any ultimate facts resolved in the defendant’s favor by the
prior acquittal. The majority’s response to the increased
risk of the jury erroneously convict the df on the present
charge, is that he is free to introduce evidence to rebut, yet
this underscores the Court’s flaw: the introduction of this
type of evidence requires the Df to mount a second defense to an
offense he has already been acquitted of. Constitutional
protection against double jeopardy applies even if the acquittal
is based on an “egregiously erroneous foundation.”
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