|
Brown v. Lober, Supreme
Ct. of IL (1979)
Author: Bram
Parties:
PL (subsequent
land purchaser) v. DF ( executor of the sellers- who got the land from someone
else)
Cause of
action/remedy sought:
The following is a cause of
action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment through constructive
eviction; remedy is damages.
Procedural
History:
Trial court found in
favor of DF. Appellate court reversed and the case went before the Supreme
court.
Facts:
In 1947, the owner of
80 acres of land conveyed that amount to William and Faith Bost, reserving 2/3rd's
interest in the mineral rights. 10 yrs later (1957), the Bosts conveyed the 80
acres to Brown and his wife by a general warranty deed with no exceptions. In
1974, the Browns contracted with a coal co to sell the mineral rights for $6K.
Upon finding out that the Browns had only 1/3 of the mineral rights, the parties
had to renegotiate the K for the payment of $2K. The prior grantor never
attempted to exercise his mineral rights. The 10 yr SOL prevented a suit on the
present covenants, so the Browns sued the Bosts' executors (because the Bosts
had died) seeking $4K in damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
PL's argued that since they
as covenantees were unable to sell their interest in land because they found out
that they did not own what the warranty deed purported to convey and thus had
suffered constructive eviction entitling them to bring a suit for breach of the
covenant of constructive eviction.
Constructive eviction is the
inability of a purchaser to obtain possession because of paramount outstanding
title; such an eviction usually constitutes a breach of the covenants of
warranty and quiet enjoyment.
For the PL's to allege
breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (which is a future covenant), he had to
have been evicted from the property (that is why they came up with constructive
eviction).
Issue(s):
Under IL property
law, did the Plaintiffs present facts which showed that there was constructive
eviction on the part of the DF's which would create a breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment?
Holding:
No. The mere fact
that the PL had to modify its K with the coal company was not enough to
constitute the constructive eviction necessary for a breach of the covenant of
enjoyment.
Court's
Rationale/Reasoning:
The court looked at
the case of Scott v. Kirkendall (although that case dealt with surface rights
while this dealt with subsurface mineral rights) where the court held that
the mere existence of a paramount (overriding) title, does not constitute a
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when there has been no assertion of
adverse title and the land has always been vacant.
·
the
court said although the PL's had possession of the surface area, they could not
be said to possess the subsurface mineral area (because to do so required
removing minerals from the ground or doing some act which show the community
that the interest is in that person's exclusive use and enjoyment.
·
The
court concluded further that the subsurface area was vacant since no one had
tried to remove minerals from it and that the PL's had in no way been prevented
from enjoying the property by anyone with a better right and PL's at any time
could have taken peaceable possession of it.
·
There could be no constructive eviction and thus no breach of the covenant quiet
enjoyment until one holding superior title interfered with the PL's right of
possession (for instance by beginning to mine the coal).
·
Court does not wish to expand the protection afforded by this covenant,
especially since the PL had a remedy in the present covenants, that of seisin
(the grantor warrants that he owns the estate he purports to convey), which
grantor clearly violated when grantor delivered the deed to P. For covenant
of seisin (which is a covenant of title), if at the time of conveyance the
grantor did not own the land, the covenant is broken immediately and in order to
recover no eviction or ouster needs to be proven.
·
It
is PL's oversight that he did not secure a title opinion before the statute of
limitations had run.
· - PL's contention
that having to modify the contract selling the mineral rights to the third party
was not sufficient to constitute the constructive eviction necessary to a breach
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
- CAUSE OF ACTION IS
PREMATURE (ripeness issue?)
Rule:
The mere existence
of a paramount (overriding) title, does not constitute a breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment when there has been no assertion of adverse title and the
land has always been vacant.
Did court
avoid issues?:
What if this cause action arose from the paramount title holder exerting his
rights.
Dicta:
N/A.
|
