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Baker vs.
Shymkiv (1983) Pg. 730
451 N.E.2d 811
Author: VanderBucks
Parties: Appellant - Plaintiff –
Baker’s wife
Appellee - Defendant –
Shymkiv
Court: Supreme Court, Ohio (1983)
Facts: 1. On 3/22/78 at 8:00 pm, Baker & his wife
returned home and pulled into his driveway. He noticed a car blocking his
driveway and observed Shymkiv & his wife throwing tools into his car and jump
into his car.
2. A trench had been dug across Baker’s
driveway. Baker approached Shymkiv, and both men got into an argument over the
trench.
3. Baker’s wife got in between the two men
and tried to calm Baker down. She went to call the cops. When she came back, she
saw Baker face down in a mud puddle while the Shymkivs drove away.
4. When the paramedics arrived, they worked
on Baker and then transported him to the hospital. He was pronounced dead later
that night.
5. Baker’s filed a claim for the wrongful
death of Baker and trespass.
Procedural
Posture: Court of Appeals – Reversed judges advice to the
jury. Ruled that damage caused by intentional trespasser whether foreseeable or
not still makes intentional trespasser liable.
Trial Court – Judge told the jury to only
apply what a reasonable person would anticipate an injury would occur by a
wrongdoer for trespassing and digging a trench on an individual’s property.
Issue: Is a trespasser only liable for the
foreseeable damages that could occur from trespassing on an individual’s
property?
Judgment: Affirms Court of Appeals decision that found error
in TC’s instruction.
Holding: “We hold that damages caused by an intentional
trespasser need not be foreseeable to be compensable.”
Relevant
Rule: “A trespass on land subjects the trespasser to liability for
physical harm to the possessor of the land at the time of the trespass, or to
the land or to his things, or to members of his household or to their things,
caused by any act done, activity carried on or condition created by the
trespasser, irrespective of whether his conduct is such as would subject him to
liability were he not a trespasser.” (Restatement Second of Torts §162).
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